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Essay: The Immorality of Originalism
Jack M. Beermann*
Abstract:
The central claim of this essay is that in interpreting the U.S. Constitution, it
is immoral to choose original intent over social welfare, broadly conceived. Once
this argument is laid out and defended on its own terms, I support the central claim
with a variety of arguments, including the defective process pursuant to which the
Constitution was enacted, the deeply flawed substantive content of the
Constitution, the incongruity of fidelity to the views of a generation of
revolutionaries, the current virtual imperviousness of the Constitution to
amendment, the failure of the Constitution to resolve fundamental questions
concerning the allocation of power within the government, which leads to
dependence on the un-democratic Supreme Court to resolve important and
controversial social issues and finally originalism’s tendency to force otherwise
honorable people to lie or obfuscate about the reasons for their official decisions.
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Essay: The Immorality of Originalism
Jack M. Beermann*
Boston University School of Law

It appears that there may now be a majority of originalists on the Supreme
Court of the United States. That’s too bad, because in most cases, originalism is
not the appropriate methodology for decision. The central claim of this essay is
that in interpreting the U.S. Constitution, it is immoral to choose original intent
over social welfare, broadly conceived. Once this argument is laid out and
defended on its own terms, I support the central claim with a variety of arguments,
including the defective process pursuant to which the Constitution was enacted, the
deeply flawed substantive content of the Constitution, the incongruity of fidelity to
the views of a generation of revolutionaries, the current virtual imperviousness of
the Constitution to amendment, the failure of the Constitution to resolve
fundamental questions concerning the allocation of power within the government,
which leads to dependence on the un-democratic Supreme Court to resolve
*
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important and controversial social issues and finally originalism’s tendency to
force otherwise honorable people to lie or obfuscate about the reasons for their
official decisions.
Although it is less central to my thesis, I also point out the multiple ways in
which originalism fails on practical grounds as a methodology. Most of this
should be familiar to the reader: Originalist judges are at best amateur historians
whose pronouncements are unreliable; original intent is often impossible to discern
and hopelessly ambiguous even on important matters concerning the structure and
powers of the government which means that just about anything can be justified
under the guise of originalism; originalists feel free to pick and choose when they
will actually follow the best sense of the original intent on important matters; and
originalism can lead to terrible results for society, for example by disabling the
federal and state governments from taking effective action against the scourge of
gun violence in the United States.
The final question I must address in this essay is that if originalist arguments
are off limits in constitutional interpretation, what arguments are not off limits, i.e.
what should originalism’s replacements be? Here, I must digress to make clear
that I do not mean to suggest that non-originalist decisionmaking will necessarily
produce socially superior results in all or even most or many cases. That depends
on the wisdom of the judges making the decisions, including their attitude toward
3
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the role of the judiciary in a democratic society. Just as schoolchildren tend to do
better with a good teacher regardless of class size, the quality of constitutional law
depends to a great extent on the judgment of the judges and justices who make the
decisions, regardless of methodology. For example, while first amendment
jurisprudence is decidedly not originalist, many people view the Court’s first
amendment decisions regarding campaign finance regulations as socially harmful,
perhaps as much so as its originalist second amendment jurisprudence. Although I
disagree with many of the Court’s first amendment decisions, the debates are
refreshing when compared, for example, to the originalist framework in gun rights
cases. Further, originalist arguments may be permissible if resolving a set of issues
based on original intent enhances social welfare either in a specific case or in a
category of cases. For example, following clear constitutional text in structural
matters may be socially beneficial by avoiding the costs of uncertainty and
instability and because the Framers of the Constitution may have arrived at
welfare-enhancing arrangements.
Thus, in my view, originalist arguments should be sidelined in favor of
debates consisting largely of arguments of social policy and legal principle, framed
against the background of the democratic, federalist structure of American
government. An important ingredient in these debates should be what has been
termed the “aspirational Constitution” that legitimizes arguments drawn from
4
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aspirations contained in general principles that point toward a decidedly nonoriginalist result. This is how Frederick Douglass treated the Constitution when he
relied on it to argue against the Constitution’s own original sin of sanctioning
slavery. It allows the development of constitutional law in light of society’s
underlying principles adapted to present-day needs and preferences. I would flavor
these discussions with a touch of textualism, not because the text of the U.S.
Constitution occupies a morally privileged place in these debates but because it
provides a non-arbitrary starting point, constrains unelected judges and advances
social stability.
The title is, of course, designed to get attention the way that scholars often
do with outlandish or extreme claims. A better title might have been “Originalism
versus Welfare.” In fact, this essay was inspired, in part, by Louis Kaplow and
Steven Shavell’s article and book entitled “Fairness versus Welfare.”1 The idea is
that in designing a system of constitutional interpretation and enforcement, it
would be wrong to sacrifice social welfare on the altar of original intent. As will
become clear, I will not argue that original intent is irrelevant. Rather, originalism
plays the same role in my analysis that fairness occupied in Kaplow and Shavell’s,

1

Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, Fairness versus Welfare (2002); Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, Fairness
versus Welfare, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 961 (2001).
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i.e. as a taste that might be satisfied and as a device that may enhance social
welfare in some circumstances.
Two words in the title must be defined, “immorality” and “originalism.” I’ll
take them in reverse order. By “originalism” I mean a method of constitutional
interpretation that privileges the original intent of the framers and/or the ratifiers of
the Constitution and treats those intentions as binding law. I recognize that there
are multiple versions of originalism, some of which are flexible enough to allow
courts to ignore or sidestep original intent in the name of other values; my focus is
on a stricter form of originalism under which a judge cannot ignore clear original
intent. I’ll lump all originalist methodologies together, including “intent of the
framers,” textualism, and “original public meaning,” recognizing that there are
difference among these methodologies and that some of my criticisms may apply
more strongly to some than to others.
By “immorality,” well, my use of “immorality” may be overstated, because I
do not mean to suggest or imply that originalists are evil or acting in bad faith to
gain personal advantage. I mean that the practice of originalism should be
condemned as a matter of principle for reasons sounding in morality. In my view,
government officials owe a duty to their constituents or subjects to work toward
advancing their welfare, and they should not sacrifice the common good in favor of
a principle like originalism or ideological purity or any other such abstraction. In
6
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other words, government officials should use their power to enhance social
welfare, not to decrease it in the name of a methodology or ideology. I recognize
that claiming that a particular practice, such as originalist constitutional
interpretation, is immoral is treacherous because there is likely to be great
disagreement over any assertion of immorality and there is no way to prove the
truth of the assertion that a practice is immoral. I will attempt to persuade the
reader that originalism is immoral, but I cannot prove it, just as no defender of
originalism or any other theory of interpretation can prove that their method is
morally sound or otherwise desirable and just as no moral theorist has ever proven
the correctness of their moral theory.
This essay proceeds as follows. In Part I, I lay out my argument that
originalism is immoral in principle. In Part II, I illustrate that originalism is not a
workable or practical theory of constitutional decisionmaking. In Part III, I
address some of the major criticisms of the ideas laid out in this essay. In Part IV,
I discuss what legal reasoning cleansed of originalist thought would like like. In
Part V, I conclude with observations of the possible consequences of abandoning
originalism for legal reasoning and the quality of constitutional decisionmaking.
I. Immorality in Principle

7
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The central argument of this essay is that rules of constitutional law should
be constructed based primarily on social welfare and decidedly not based on the
original intent of the Framers or adopters of the Constitution, however discerned.
This argument builds on Lewis Kaplow and Steven Shavell’s article and book,
“Fairness versus Welfare.” Their decades-old thesis, that “legal rules should be
selected entirely with respect to their effects on the well-being of individuals in
society” and that “notions of fairness . . . should receive no independent weight in
the assessment of legal rules,”2 is controversial, to say the least. Some readers
were left shaking their heads at the notion that a system of justice should ignore
notions of justice and fairness. But Kaplow and Shavell’s point was much more
moderate, and sensible, than it appears at first glance.
Their main point was that legal rules should be constructed with
“individuals’ welfare” as the sole consideration. Their concern was that a legal
rule constructed on the basis of some other consideration such as fairness could
leave everyone subject to it worse off, a truly perverse result and inconsistent even
with the insights of liberal legal philosophers who were extremely concerned with
fairness, such as John Rawls, who claimed that rational people would agree to
social structures that produced unequal results so long as the least well off in
society were made at least marginally better off by unequal results than equal
2

Kaplow and Shavell, supra note x at 3-4.
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ones.3 To Kaplow and Shavell, the only significant role fairness should play in
constructing legal rules is to recognize that people have a taste for fairness and that
because they prefer to live in a society that treats them, and all of its members,
fairly, social welfare would be diminished if fairness played no significant role in
legal decisionmaking. Thus, in measuring the social utility of any legal rule, one
consideration must be whether enforcing it would reduce social welfare because
peoples’ taste for fairness would not be satisfied. This should not be a
controversial observation; people are often concerned with how the law treats
others and are willing to lend political support to efforts to change laws that they
expect will never be applied to them, such as welfare laws, criminal laws and
provisions of the tax code that apply only to the poor or the wealthy.
There is an important aspect of their thesis that is left unclear, which is
whether a rule that has crushingly terrible consequences for a small group of
people but significantly enhances the welfare of society as a whole is acceptable
under their theory. Their repeated references to “the well-being of individuals in
society” makes it appear that they are adopting some form of Pareto-optimality,
under which rules are unacceptable if they make some “individuals in society” or
group of individuals worse off. Since they cannot rely on fairness for the choice
between pure utilitarianism and Pareto-optimality, it must be either that they
3

John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971); John Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993).
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believe that peoples’ taste for fairness would prevent adoption of rules that made
some people worse off or that their definition of the “well-being of individuals in
society” necessarily implies such a principle. The only light I can throw on this is
to speculate that perhaps Kaplow and Shavell were confident that policymakers
would not be likely to adopt rules that were overly harmful to some people and
they could thus be vague on this score. My own view is that rules of law,
regardless of methodology, often have terrible effects on individuals and groups of
individuals (whether justified or not), but the welfare of individuals, as they put it,
or social welfare, as I would phrase it, is a more defensible guiding principle in
constitutional law than the original intent of the Framers of the Constitution,
however discerned.
In my view, originalism should be viewed as parallel in constitutional law to
the fairness of Kaplow and Shavell’s work in all areas of law. The conventional
argument for originalism, especially as an exclusive or binding requirement for
constitutional decisionmaking, is based largely on principles, some contested, such
as the nature of a written constitution or a requirement for the legitimacy of legal
decisionmaking, and not on considerations of social welfare. And insofar as the
original intent of the Framers of the Constitution produces superior results for
social welfare, it ought to be followed, but not because of any principle of fidelity
to the original intent. In fact, if I could be persuaded that judges, legislators and
10
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executive officials would make better decisions overall if they felt that they were
bound by original intent, I would endorse it as a guiding principle in constitutional
law, but again not as a matter of principle but because of its superiority as a matter
of social welfare. (I will elaborate below on why I am skeptical of this last notion.)
Social welfare emanates from constitutional decisions in different ways
depending on the sort of issue involved. For example, a decision on constitutional
rights may have immediate and direct social welfare impacts. More freedom to
engage in an activity, for example allowing the use of previously banned
substances in religious rituals, may immediately enhance the welfare of those
desiring to engage in it. Assuming no negative effects on others or on the
participants themselves, a right like this ought to be recognized in a sensible
understanding of constitutional law regardless of whether the Framers would have
intended it. The social welfare effects of other rights may be less immediately
ascertainable. For example, the social costs or benefits of an expansive application
of the right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure may be due to the
effects on police practices generally (which could be socially harmful or
beneficial) and not on the case in which the right is recognized or applied, where a
crime may go unpunished and a criminal undeterred.
Strict adherence to the ideal of separation of powers is often portrayed as
necessary to preserve liberty, but the causal chain between separation of powers
11
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and the preservation of liberty is usually difficult to discern. Two examples of
current controversy are illustrative. The Supreme Court has in several recent
decisions made it more difficult for Congress to impose restrictions on the
President’s power to remove executive branch officials.4 Is this likely to enhance
liberty? It depends on numerous factors including the definition of liberty, the
policies of the President and the likely policies of officials subject to more or less
presidential control. As Abraham Lincoln famously said, “The shepherd drives the
wolf from the sheep's throat, for which the sheep thanks the shepherd as his
liberator, while the wolf denounces him for the same act as the destroyer of liberty.
Plainly, the sheep and the wolf are not agreed upon a definition of liberty.” If
liberty is defined simply as freedom from regulation, i.e. from the perspective of
Lincoln’s wolf, then more presidential control might enhance liberty if the
particular President takes a deregulatory or anti-regulatory approach, and makes
appointment and removal decisions with that in mind. The opposite would be true
if the President identified more with the sheep and supported strong regulation.
A more sophisticated view of liberty might consider whether regulation
would enhance peoples’ ability to develop their lives and participate in social,
economic and political life and would view regulation designed to achieve that end

4

E.g., Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, 561 U.S. 477 (2010); Collins v.
Yellen, 141 S. Ct. 1761 (2021).
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as enhancing liberty overall even if regulated parties were subject to more
restrictions. Liberty to pollute the environment might enhance the liberty of the
owners of the polluting enterprises while reducing the liberty of those who die
premature deaths and suffer serious health consequences from the pollution.
Under this definition, the likely effect of more presidential control on liberty would
be the opposite of the effect under the previous definition. Of course, this all
depends on whether presidential control would have a significant effect on agency
policy, which is subject to multiple additional influences such as legal constraints,
judicial review and pressure from interest groups and congressional oversight.
There is also no immediately or intuitively discernible social welfare effect
of these decisions. Who knows whether a removable director of the Consumer
Finance Protection Board would do a better job of enhancing social welfare than a
director who can be removed only for cause?5 It may not matter at all, it may
enhance social welfare by subjecting the director to political control or it may
reduce social welfare by hampering the director’s ability to take action against
politically powerful entities or people who may diminish social welfare for their
own selfish reasons. The only thing we do know is that a removable director is
somewhat more likely to advance the President’s policies, which means the most

5

Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183 (2020).
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important social welfare indicator is likely to be the wisdom, in social welfare
terms, of the President’s preferences.
A similar analysis applies to the possibility that the Supreme Court will
create a strict nondelegation doctrine under which Congress may not delegate the
power to make important policy decisions to agencies.6 Who knows whether this
would enhance or decrease welfare? The nondelegation doctrine’s enhancement of
liberty allegedly occurs mainly due to a lower volume of law—there is no way that
Congress could or would produce the volume of law that agencies produce on
important matters. Law made by a representative body such as Congress may also
be more attentive to social welfare and individual liberty than law made by an
agency not directly subject to voter approval. As Justice Gorsuch stated in a recent
dissent advocating for a strict nondelegation norm, “[s]ome occasionally complain
about Article I’s detailed and arduous processes for new legislation, but to the
framers these were bulwarks of liberty.”7 The preference for less law is based on
an assumption that law decreases liberty, but as in the above example, that is far
from clear. Is there more liberty in a society in which government is not involved
in protecting the environment or safeguarding consumers from fraud and
dangerous products, where government does not help ensure the availability of

6

See Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2131-48 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., joined by Roberts, C.J. & Thomas, J.,
arguing for reinvigoration of the nondelegation doctrine).
7
Id. at 2134.
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adequate and safe medical care, safe and healthful working conditions, adequate
food and shelter and sufficient education to prepare all members of society for
participation in economic and political affairs? Answers to questions like these are
highly dependent on the definition of liberty.
There is also no clear path between a strictly enforced nondelegation
doctrine and enhanced social welfare. In fact, in research on the costs and benefits
of regulation cuts both ways with some analyses concluding that regulation
enhances social welfare while others claim it has the opposite effect.8 There are
many vocal opponents of regulation among business interests that chafe at the
effects of regulation on their bottom lines, but opposition from the subjects of
regulation is to be expected and does not necessarily reflect overall social welfare
effects. Small increases to the welfare of millions of people may attract less
attention than decreases to the wealth of the few whose aggregate losses are lower.
Another alleged effect of restricting agency policymaking and reserving
authority to Congress is enhanced deliberation which leads to higher quality rules
and standards. But once again there is no empirical support for the conclusion that
Congress makes higher quality decisions than the agencies to which Congress
8

See, e.g., Paul L. Joskow & Nancy L. Rose, The Effects of Economic Regulation in Handbook of Industrial
Organization, Vol. 11 (Richard L. Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig eds. 1989); Brian Wallheimer, Why Less
Regulation Isn’t Necessarily Better, Chicago Booth Review (Feb. 25. 2019) available at
https://www.chicagobooth.edu/review/why-less-regulation-isnt-necessarily-better; John F. Morrall, III, A Review of
the Record, Regulation, Nov./Dec. 1986; Lisa Heinzerling & Frank Ackerman, The Humbugs of the AntiRegulatory Movement, 87 Cornell L. Rev. 648 (2002).
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routinely delegates broad policymaking discretion. At a minimum, agency
expertise and their ability to act with dispatch when confronted with pressing
problems are logical counterweights to the value of legislative deliberation and
delay.
Further, the idea that unelected judges should override the Congress’s
choices regarding the structure of government because Congress is a superior
deliberative body is dripping with irony. After all, the result of judicial
intervention is to reject Congress’s judgments, arrived at after the desired
deliberation, concerning the optimal structure of agencies and their optimal range
of policymaking discretion. To create agencies and delegate powers to them
requires Congress to deliberate and navigate the procedural shoals that originalists
like Justice Gorsuch identify as the normative underpinnings of their view. There
is no reason to believe that legal training and experience as an attorney, Circuit
Judge and Supreme Court Justice leads to better judgment than Congress’s, acting
through its bicameral deliberative process that are allegedly the bulwarks against
low quality excessive infringements of liberty. And I have not even mentioned the
role of the President whose veto pen further enhances the reliability of Congress’s
determinations.
The lack of empirical support for these assertions leads me to sense that they
are motivated more by adherence to ideological principle or loyalty to interests that
16
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would benefit from less regulation than by actual evidence of the welfare effects or
even the overall effects on individual liberty. This all depends, in part, on an
assessment of how the agencies have done up to now, and that’s a complicated and
politically controversial question. In short, answers to empirical questions are
often ideological, and ideology is often destructive of rational thought and sober
assessment. It should not be the basis for constructing substantial limits on the
democratically accountable branches of government.
It is important at this point to dispel the impression that my argument is
designed to attack conservative arguments rather than make a broad, neutral attack
on originalism. The above examples are drawn from current events in a situation
that involves a rising and active conservative Supreme Court majority. But I
would apply the exact same analysis to developments that move constitutional law
in a more liberal direction. If evidence established that confining delegation would
enhance social welfare, I would support strict application of a nondelegation
principle. Similarly, if it could be shown that expansive application of the Fourth
Amendment’s exclusionary rule was inconsistent with social welfare, I would
favor cutting back on its protections regardless of the intent of the Framers. (In
fact, I have always been skeptical of the exclusionary rule’s truth-crushing function
and its imposition of the social costs of officers’ violations on society as a whole.)
Because constitutional law is rarely debated in policy terms, it is difficult to
17
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analyze the social effects of most doctrines of constitutional law without
conducting extensive empirical research for which I, and the judges who make the
decisions, lack both the skill and the resources.
My main point is that originalism is wrong on principle insofar as it
sacrifices the welfare of society to a fantastic idea of what the Framers intended
when they crafted the Constitution in the 1780s. To me, it’s simply a bizarre
notion that the welfare of the more than three hundred twenty five million people
living in the United States is less important than what the Framers agreed to in the
context of the social problems and political disagreements that occupied them
nearly 250 years ago and in a process that excluded the vast majority of inhabitants
of the country from participation. Perhaps if the Framers were oracles of truth and
justice the case for originalism would be stronger, but we all know that they made
mistakes and compromised moral principle in favor of the welfare of those in the
dominant race, gender and social class of their generation to which they belonged.
There is no convincing argument that we should be stuck with their decisions.
It also strikes me as an extremely odd idea that the views of a revolutionary
generation should be forever frozen into the fabric of our society’s constitutional
law. Although I do not want to make the paradoxical error of rejecting originalism
based on the original intent of the Framers, I have been able to find little indication
that the Framers themselves thought or intended that their views would govern
18
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future constitutional understandings. They were reacting to a unique set of
challenges and opportunities and they constructed what they viewed at the time as
the best, politically palatable solutions. It is perhaps an unfortunate historical
reality that successful revolutionaries become entrenched and their views dominate
even after their utility has vanished with the years, but in a society with a choice,
there is no principled reason to go down that path.9
Another reason that has been cited to cast doubt on originalism as an
appropriate methodology for construing the Constitution is that the Framers were
more likely to embrace natural law theories than the sort of radical positivism that
strict originalism entails.10 I don’t want to make too much of this observation for
two reasons, the first being the obvious irony in citing originalist reasons for
rejecting originalism and the second being that the argument is, in my view, based
on the sort of cherry-picking of Framers’ statements that infects all forms of
originalism. While it is true that the Framers made many statements consisting
with natural law theory, they also made plenty of statements consistent with a more
positivist view of law, including the 1798 decision in Calder v. Bull that is often
cited as evidence of Justice Chase’s embrace of a non-textual, natural law theory of

9

Strict forms of originalism also prevent social progress through the learning process inherent in a system of
precedent in which legal change is allowed. See Theodore P. Seto, Originalism vs. Precedent: An Evolutionary
Perspective, 38 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 2001 (2005).
10
See Jonathan Gienapp, Written Constitutionalism, Past and Present, 39 Law & History Review 321 (2021); John
Mikhail, Does Originalism Have a Natural Law Problem?, 39 Law & History Review 361 (2021).
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constitutional interpretation.11 In that case, most of the Justices relied upon the
original meaning of the Ex Post Facto clause to reject the Calders’ argument
against retroactive civil legislative action, a decidedly positivist methodology.
Justice Thomas, an avowed originalist, has made an interesting argument for
limited incorporation of natural law into constitutional interpretation. At his
confirmation hearings, and in a more recent documentary, he explained why he
believes that constitutional law includes natural law elements.12 He agrees with the
view that the Framers adhered to natural law ideas and would reject positivism as
the predominant method of understanding legal rights. It’s a bit more complicated
than this because Justice Thomas, citing the Declaration of Independence’s
statement that people “are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable
Rights,” equates natural law with divinely granted rights. In other words, the
rights of Americans are God-given, transmitted by the Framers through the
Constitution. But then Justice Thomas insists that we are bound by the version of
natural law adopted by the Framers, not because of any notion that they and only
they have true insight into divine providence but because the intent of the Framers
is binding positive law. In other words, Justice Thomas’s argument for

11

Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386 (1798).
Hearings Before the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, One Hundred Second Congress, First
Session, On the Nomination of Clarence Thomas to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States,
102d Cong., at 16-17, 147 (1993); Created Equal: Clarence Thomas in His Own Words (2020) (motion picture). His
comments on natural law occur near the end of the film, at about the 1 hour 49 minute mark.
12
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originalism, at bottom, adds nothing to the simple assertion that the Framers’ intent
is binding law, and it paradoxically cuts off contemporary discussion of natural law
principles and the nature or content of divine providence. Just as a simple
example, some believers in divine providence may think that reading the
Constitution to require the government to provide food, shelter and medical care to
people who otherwise could not afford it is more plausible than reading it to
sanction slavery and prohibit two layers of for-cause protection for government
officials exercising discretionary executive power.
The difficulty of amending the Constitution contributes to the immorality of
tying American society to it, or more accurately to the judicially-imagined version
of the original intent underlying it that has been created by judicial decisions. The
Framers themselves ignored two aspects of the country’s prior constitution, The
Articles of Confederation, when they constructed the Constitution, namely its
declaration that it had created a perpetual union and its unanimous consent
requirement for alterations. This was wise—social realities revealed the Articles’
defects and the architects of the new Constitution did not allow intent of the
framers of the Articles to hinder social welfare. I have written elsewhere that this
important episode in our history is precedent for a new constitutional convention:
the 20 most populous states could follow the example of the Framers when they
discarded the Articles and frame a new constitution among themselves, and then
21
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invite the others to join them the way Rhode Island was invited to join the new
union after not participating in the Philadelphia convention.13
Of course, the cumbersome process for amending the Constitution is
certainly viewed by many as a feature, not a bug. More than shifting political
winds should result in major changes to the country’s governing structure. An
easily amendable Constitution could lead to instability and provide opportunities
for powerful interests to subvert government power for private gain. These are
empirical assertions, not matters of principle detached from considerations of
social welfare. But in current circumstances with deep divisions and widespread
dissatisfaction with government institutions across the political spectrum,
something is amiss, and it ought to be more than theoretically possible to do
something about it. For those of us tired of feeling hamstrung by the unwillingness
of a major segment of society to recognize reality and move into the twenty-first
century, radical actions like framing a new constitution outside the current
Constitution’s amendment process have become increasingly attractive.
It might be different if the process for enacting the Constitution gave it a
special claim to legitimacy, but alas it does not. The majority of Americans were
excluded from the political process that led to the adoption of the Constitution.

13

Jack M. Beermann, The New Constitution of the United States: Do We Need One and How Would We Get One?
in Symposium, America's Political Dysfunction: Constitutional Connections, Causes and Cures, 94 Boston
University Law Review 711 (2014).
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Imagine what Americans would think if another country embarked on a process of
creating a new Constitution and did not allow women, racial minorities, and
millions of enslaved people to participate in the project. It may not be not wrong
to view what happened in 1789 as a product of the times, but that’s the point.
While it might excuse the Framers’ conduct from a moral standpoint, the product
of those times has no good claim to legitimacy for binding us today.
The discriminatory nature of the process for framing the Constitution might
be forgivable if in operation the Constitution created a model of equality and
inclusion. But this did not occur. Millions of Americans remained enslaved for
the first six decades of the Constitution’s existence, and after more than a half
million Americans died in the fight to end it, the former slaves and their ancestors
were thrown into a new form of subjugation nearly as toxic as the old when federal
troops were withdrawn from the South and the Supreme Court endorsed racial
segregation.14 Officially sanctioned discrimination against racial minorities
continues, perhaps to die a slow painful death as demographics eventually outrun
the ability of currently dominant groups to restrict voting rights and minimize nonwhite political power, but perhaps not. The Constitution facilitates barriers to full
membership in society for tens of millions of Americans and suppresses their

14

See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); Hall v. Decuir, 95 U.S. 485
(1878).
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economic, social and spiritual growth. A constitution made today with full and
equal participatory rights for all Americans would likely turn out radically different
from what he have, although given the divisions in American society it is difficult
to predict exactly how.
In fact, the injustices that have plagued American society are an independent
reason for rejecting originalism as a morally justifiable method of constitutional
interpretation. The original Constitution’s codification of slavery and its
enhancement of slave power in Congress render excessive attention to the
intentions of the people who framed it morally questionable, at a minimum. The
Constitution’s decades-long impotence to prevent the injustice of Jim Crow and
lynch law, the mistreatment of North America’s indigenous people, the subjugation
of waves of immigrants beginning, perhaps, with the Chinese and the internment of
loyal citizens of Japanese descent during World War II are further evidence of the
moral frailty of the document. Originalists expect society to surrender to the
intentions of those who set in motion a social system that achieved greatness at the
expense of the weak and marginalized and in which inequality has only grown, not
only inequality of achievement but inequality of opportunity, which is one of the
great social problems facing today’s United States. Constitutional law is one of the
great contributors to inequality.
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The strongest argument for originalism is that it has the potential, allegedly
more than any other theory, to create the stability necessary for a society to thrive
in virtually all dimensions, including economics, politics, religion, science, the arts
and humanities, and even more mundane social pursuits such as sports and
entertainment. It is undoubtedly true that stability is important and that instability
is destructive of all aspects of social life. For example, there are those who think
that life in Iraq under Saddam Hussein was preferable to what that society has
become in the wake of the invasion that deposed him and his government. This
may seem pragmatic and not principled, but in my view it is at least occupies space
along a fuzzy border between the practical and the principled. There is great moral
value in the establishment of a stable order in which social institutions can thrive.
Any particular stable order may, of course, suffer from deep, even irredeemable,
moral failings. But in light of human nature, stability itself is a virtue, as unalloyed
as it may be.
In this regard, the U.S. Constitution has only partially succeeded in creating
a stable society. It has facilitated a society stable enough to permit unprecedented
economic prosperity, with wealth and privilege for some beyond most people’s
wildest dreams. The American Dream has been a realistic goal for millions of
people not fortunate enough to have been born into wealth and privilege, and has
been a beacon to immigrants from around the world. But it was insufficient to
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prevent Civil War, and the run up to that conflict revealed the Constitution’s
failure to resolve key issues concerning the relative powers of state and national
governments. Social unrest has continued throughout the period since then. Only
violence, public and private, resolved the unrest that erupted in the twentieth
century over racial injustice, and labor peace was won in the long run by crushing
labor unions through constitutional law, imposing limitations on the ability of
unions to compel employees to support their efforts and enhancing the ability of
corporations to influence political campaigns. What has resulted is a deeply
divided polity that cannot even come together to fight a deadly pandemic.
I want to make one important aspect of the argument perfectly and
unmistakably clear: this is not an argument for privileging economic prosperity
over all other values. My definition of “social welfare” includes everything that
makes a society a better place for people. This includes prosperity, but it also
includes individual happiness, autonomy, respect for the rights and interests of
humans and other living creatures, equality, opportunity (both economic and noneconomic) and community. In this, my view is likely inconsistent with Kaplow
and Shavell’s insistence that fairness is relevant only when linked to human
satisfaction based on a preference for realizing fairness and other similar values.
My view is that values are a necessary element of human society and that societies
that realize the ambitions inherent in their values are better places than those that
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do not. In other words, social welfare is a broad concept that embraces creating
and maintaining a better world. What it does not include is acting out of an
abstract commitment to an ideological premise, although I would include
satisfaction of ideological preferences as an element of social welfare even though
I find such preferences fraught with danger of harming social welfare out of a
sense of loyalty to the abstract.
II. The Practical Impracticality of Originalism
In addition to the immorality of originalism as a matter of principle, there
are multiple practical reasons to reject originalism as a theory of constitutional
interpretation. These include the unreliability of what has been termed “law office
history” which is more akin to advocacy than genuine historical research; the fact
that so many issues cannot be definitively resolved with reference to text and
history which cries out for a different methodology; the tendency of otherwise
honorable people to dissemble by justifying decisions made on other grounds with
reference to original intent; and the terrible practical results that originalists impose
on society while disabling pragmatic challenges to their conclusions. There is no
secret society with special access to the true history of the Constitution enacted by
mythic creatures known as the Framers. Rather, there are competing views,
contradictory texts and conflicting histories, leaving originalism as a singularly
unattractive method of constitutional construction.
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A. Amateur history and gaping holes
In my view, the most fundamental practical difficulty with originalism is
that the Framers left many important issues unresolved in the Constitution’s text
and history. This means that another method of interpretation is necessary to
answer vital constitutional questions. Let me name just one unresolved issue, a
pretty important one, the power of the President to use military force without a
declaration of war from Congress. The Constitution is clear on two matters: the
President is commander in chief of the armed forces and Congress has the power to
declare war. That’s about where clarity ends; there is not even agreement on what
it means to “declare war,” whether such a declaration necessary to commence
military action or is it more simply a declaration that the United States considers
itself legally in a state of war with another nation?15
To muddy the waters further, Congress has the power to “make Rules for the
Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces” raising questions
concerning the extent of the President’s commander in chief powers. In 1973,
Congress passed the War Powers Resolution over President Richard Nixon’s veto,
restricting the President’s power in this area,16 and although Presidents have abided
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See, generally, David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb—A
Constitutional History, 121 Harv. L. Rev. 941 (2008); Phillip Bobbitt, War Powers: An Essay on John Hart Ely's
War and Responsibility: Constitutional Lessons of Vietnam and Its Aftermath, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 1364 (1994)
16
See War Powers Act, Pub. L. 93-148, 87 Stat. 55 (1973), codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541 et. seq.
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by the terms of the Act, they have stated on the record that they do so out of
courtesy to Congress because, in their view, the Act unconstitutionally restricts
their power as commander in chief.17 Originalists have not succeeded in resolving
this basic matter of constitutional law.
When the text leaves gaping holes such as these, originalists hunt for
evidence of the Framers’ intent in documents such as the Federalist Papers, other
contemporary writings, early Supreme Court decisions, early actions by Congress
and the President and the debates at the constitutional convention. There, lawyerly
cherry picking reaches the level of high art; comments are yanked out of context
and presented as proof of one view or another and contrary comments are ignored
or explained away. Practices and judicial decisions that may have been hotly
contested in the 1790s are held up as proof of underlying settled intent. And in the
vast majority of cases, original intent happily coincides with the political
preferences of the Court majority, for example finding that the absence of a
Takings Clause in the Fourteenth Amendment is of no moment since the Framers
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For example, when he signed a resolution authorizing the use of military force in Lebanon in 1983, President
Ronald Reagan declared in a signing statement that his signature should not be viewed as acknowledging the
constitutionality of the restrictions on the use of force imposed by the War Powers Resolution. See Statement on
Signing the Multinational Force in Lebanon Resolution (Oct. 12, 1983) available at
https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/speech/statement-signing-multinational-force-lebanon-resolution. President
Biden’s recent letter to the Speaker House and President Pro Tempore of the Senate reporting on U.S. military
activity carefully characterized the report as “consistent with the War Powers Resolution” not in compliance with it.
See Letter to the Speaker of the House and President Pro Tempore of the Senate Regarding the War Powers Report
(June 8, 2021), available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/06/08/letter-to-thespeaker-of-the-house-and-president-pro-tempore-of-the-senate-regarding-the-war-powers-report/.
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intended to incorporate the compensation requirement into the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. More often than not, a sober account would admit
that the most that can be said is that the Framers had differing views or, in many
cases, did not consider the matter in the depth necessary to resolve questions that
arise. Instead, scholars and judges claim that history is on their side, when in
reality text and history can justify multiple results and support none with the clarity
that ought to be present before making an important constitutional decision.
Of course, there is nothing untoward when historians form opinions without
conclusive evidence or when they stack inference upon inference to come up with
likely understandings. But historians don’t impose their views on others through
law and the mechanisms of state coercion. When the Supreme Court imposes its
will on hundreds of millions of people, fifty state governments, Congress and the
President, it ought to base its actions on something more than contested views of
history based on flimsy research. At the very least least, there should be strong
indications that the Court’s judgment rests on or will improve social welfare. But
another negative practical effect of originalist thought is that it displaces other
methods of constitutional law-making by rendering them presumptively
illegitimate. Jurists are rightly afraid to admit when their decisions are purely
normative when historical sources leave important issues unresolved, preventing
open debate about the true, perhaps more attractive, bases for decisions.
30

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3983598

A prime example of competing histories is the debate over whether the
Framers of the Second Amendment intended it to protect an individual right to own
a firearm for self-defense and whether such a right is enforceable against only
federal regulation or also against state and local gun control measures. The
Supreme Court’s opinions on this reveal, at best, uncertainty and perhaps division
among the Framers, but each side, pro and con, claims that the history certainly
supports their view.18 Whether the easy availability of handguns is catastrophic to
the well-being of millions of Americans is virtually irrelevant to judges who
pledge fealty to their (contested) view of the intent of the Framers. On my reading,
the history is inconclusive and the text leans in the direction of an inextricable link
between military preparedness and gun ownership. In fact, handguns for personal
use are not in my view addressed at all by the Second Amendment; textualists may
have a better argument for private ownership of military weaponry. Of course, I
don’t claim that my view reflects the actual intent of the Framers, I actually have
no firm idea, but I don’t think the Supreme Court majority that has effectively
struck down dozens of gun control knows either.
A similar analysis could be applied to numerous fundamental constitutional
issues. For example, there is perhaps no more significant structural constitutional
argument than whether the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment intended that
18

See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008); McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010).
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amendment to apply the Bill of Rights against the states. Without what is termed
“incorporation” of the Bill of Rights, very few practices of state and local
governments would be touched by federal constitutional law. The text certainly
does not answer this fundamental question and even originalist judges and scholars
have disagreed over it for decades, perhaps for more than a century. As in the gun
control area, there is good evidence on both sides and no conclusive evidence one
way or the other. My inclination is to doubt that incorporation was within the
amendment’s intent, if only on the basis that if the Framers meant to resolve such
an important issue, they would have included text to that effect. But that’s only an
inclination of which I am far from confident.
The incorporation debate is, in fact, a good example of a legal dispute over
methodology that ultimately carried little practical importance. One faction on the
Court, led originally by Justice Benjamin Cardozo, argued for “selective
incorporation,” pursuant to which only some of the provisions of the Bill of Rights
would be applied against the states. Cardozo’s standard was to incorporate those
rights that are “of the very essence of ordered liberty” and embody “a principle of
justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked
fundamental.”19 Later, as the Court applied Justice Cardozo’s standard, Justice
Black became the standard bearer for an originalist argument for total
19
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incorporation: in his view, “one of the chief objects that the provisions of the
[Fourteenth] Amendment’s first section . . . .were intended to accomplish was to
make the Bill of Rights, applicable to the states.”20 In addition to historical
research which, to Black, supported his view of the Framers’s intent, Justice Black
rejected selective incorporation as built on the erroneous view that “this Court is
endowed by the Constitution with boundless power under ‘natural law’
periodically to expand and contract constitutional standards to conform to the
Court’s conception of what, a particular time, constitutes ‘civilized decency’ and
‘fundamental liberty and justice.’”21 He thus attacked selective incorporation as
granting too much discretion to judges who might smuggle their own viewpoints
into the law.
The reason that this methodological dispute turned out to carry little
importance is that while the Court adhered to the Cardozo approach, and
incorporated only those rights deemed fundamental, over the decades virtually all
of the provisions of the Bill of Rights have qualified under that standard, resulting
in nearly total incorporation. The only exceptions to total incorporation still
standing are the Sixth Amendment’s requirement of a jury of twelve in a criminal

20
21

Adamson.v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 71-72 (1947) (Black, J. dissenting).
Id. At 69.
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case22 and the Seventh Amendment’s right to a jury trial in civil cases and the
prohibition of reexamination of facts tried to a jury “other than according to the
rules of the common law.”23 But there is one positive element to the triumph of
partial incorporation theory over total incorporation theory, namely the refreshing
discussion on the Court over whether particular rights were essential to a system of
ordered liberty or rooted in the conscience of our people. That, in my view, is a
more sensible way of deciding cases than tying the law to the intent of the
eighteenth century constitutional Framers.
B. The Effect on Judges and Scholars
The felt necessity to base important decisions on original intent also forces
judges to dissemble, essentially leading to misleading opinions that obscure their
true bases. A prime example is the Supreme Court’s decision requiring law
enforcement officers to “knock and announce” when executing a warrant at a
private dwelling.24 The originalist basis for the Court’s decision, in an opinion by
Justice Clarence Thomas, is that the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness
requirement incorporates the common law requiring an announcement. The Court

22

Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970). In McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971) the Court held that
there is no right to a jury trial in state juvenile proceedings, but the basis for that decision appears to be that
juvenile proceedings are simply not covered at all by the Sixth Amendment. The most recent incorporation
decision held that juries in state criminal cases must be unanimous, overruling an earlier decision that this
requirement was not incorporated. See Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390 (2020), overruling Apodaca v. Oregon,
406 U.S. 404 (1972).
23
See Minneapolis & St. Louis Railway Co. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211 (1916).
24
Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 (1995).
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acknowledged that the rule did not apply to felony arrests, citing an 1884 treatise
making the point, but then concluded that “[t]he common-law principle gradually
was applied to cases involving felonies.”25 The Court’s earliest citation for this
point is an 1822 English decision (there goes the aversion to citing foreign law in
U.S. constitutional cases) which post-dates the adoption of the Fourth Amendment
by more than thirty years, making it impossible for the Framers of the Fourth
Amendment to have incorporated the rule. An originalist like Justice Thomas
simply cannot admit that the reasons for applying knock and announce in most
circumstances are normative, that knock and announce likely results in less
violence, greater respect for property and privacy and more orderly execution of
warrants.26 Instead, originalism forces judges to dissemble and obfuscate on the
reasons for their decisions.
While this may be more of a principled objection than a practical one, I
actually find the form of originalism that claims that the Framers incorporated
well-established features of English common law into the United States
Constitution the most bizarre claim of all. The Framers overthrew a system of

25

Id. at 935.
Consider the recent heartbreaking example that occurred in Minneapolis, Minnesota. The police, executing a
no-knock warrant shot and killed an innocent man within 10 seconds of breaking down the door to an apartment
where a homicide suspect might have been. The man, Amir Locke, apparently woke up and grabbed his legallyowned gun, exercising his constitutional right to bear arms for self-defense. The officers, seeing the gun and
apparently fearing for their safety, shot Locke numerous times, killing him. See Minneapolis Releases Video of
Shooting, New York Times A17 (Feb. 5, 2022).
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government they rejected as tyrannical. It seems odd to suppose that
simultaneously with rejecting a system of government they intended to incorporate
(implicitly) that system’s well-established features into their new, highly
experimental Constitution. Incorporation might be a good idea; some features of
English common law might be well-suited for application in the United States, and
the ability to draw upon a preexisting set of rules might increase stability and add
an air of legitimacy to the decisions of federal judges. The practical problem is
that because the entire enterprise is so dubious, there is not developed standard for
determining which features of English common-law are incorporated and which
are not. For example, was English common law’s rejection of slavery incorporated
into American law?27
This reinforces the greatest practical difficulty with originalism, that in
virtually all controversial cases originalism can be deployed to support the
arguments of both sides if only to debunk the supposedly originalist claims of one
party seeking to overturn the political decision under attack. Thus, at least as
practiced in the Supreme Court of the United States, originalism does not provide
either of the virtues that might otherwise support such an enterprise; it does not
meaningfully constrain judges and it does not apply positive law to cases involving
controversial constitutional issues. This tends to be true of legal reasoning more
27
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generally: on close examination the claim that legal reasoning constrains judges
rings hollow and the rule of law ideal of judges applying a determinate neutral
body of rules is rarely even approached, even in cases applying positive law such
as statutory and constitutional text. And yet judges and scholars are forced to
pretend, and perhaps have even convinced themselves, that their historical research
has revealed the single correct answer to questions that the Framers did not answer
and perhaps never even considered.
A case of statutory construction by one of the Court’s avowed originalists
provides another good example of the way that originalism forces judges to
pretend that the socially preferable results happen to coincide with the views of
lawgivers. In the Bostock decision,28 Justice Gorsuch’s opinion for the majority
extended the protections of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to transgender
and homosexual individuals who are discriminated against by their employers
based on that status. Justice Gorsuch admitted that “[t]hose who adopted the Civil
Rights Act might not have anticipated their work would lead to this particular
result” and declared that [t]his Court normally interprets a statute in accord with
the ordinary public meaning of its terms at the time of its enactment.”29 His
opinion then goes through lengthy unconvincing gyrations in an attempt to
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Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020).
Id at 1737, 1738.
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convince the reader that the Court’s decision is consistent with the “ordinary public
meaning” of the statutory language.30 In dissent, Justice Alito, joined by Justice
Thomas, characterized the Court’s reading of the statute as “preposterous”31
Justice Kavanaugh, in his separate dissent, argued convincingly that while the
Court’s reading of the statute might be literally correct, it was not consistent with
the text’s “ordinary meaning” which, as Justice Gorsuch stated, is the current
originalist touchstone.32 In my view, Justice Gorsuch’s most convincing argument
is one that he did not make, that reading Title VII to prohibit discrimination against
homosexual and transgender individuals is a better fit in today’s society than
excluding them and that the prohibition advances social welfare by outlawing
irrational employment decisions and making ours a more inclusive, just society.33
I understand that there are originalists who, in good faith, believe that their
view of the intent of the Framers is correct, whether it is consistent with the text of
the Constitution or not. My guess is that it is a common experience for skeptics
like me to encounter people who insist that they have discovered the true original
intent and that courts ought to apply that intent because it is the correct view of
positive, binding law. Usually, these conclusions “just happen” to be consistent
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See id at 1740-49.
Id at 1755 (Alito, J. dissenting).
32
Id at 1824-25 (Kavanaugh, J. dissenting).
33
See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation (1994).
31
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with the holders’ general political opinions. People who support gun rights have
strong views about the intent underlying the Second Amendment; people who
oppose federal regulation have strong views about the intent underlying the
Commerce Clause and so on. In short, in my experience views on original intent
follow the heart, not vice versa.
III. The Response
Needless to say, my thesis in this paper has provoked strongly negative
reactions from many colleagues unfortunate enough to have been exposed to it.
While there are multiple credible bases to dispute my thesis and analysis, I will
respond here to the two most obvious critiques. The first repeats the assertion that
is the basis for most originalist thought, that only originalism is consistent with the
status of the Constitution as positive law, and in fact fidelity to the original intent
underlying the Constitution is an imperative that is implicit in the nature of a
written document representing higher law. The second, most common practical
criticism is that, similar to reactions to the indeterminacy critique more generally,
without methodological constraints, judges are completely free to impose their will
on the law. This is even worse when it comes to constitutional law because
without the constraining influence of originalism, the Constitution, adopted by the
people and purposely made difficult to amend, becomes whatever the Justices of
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the Supreme Court say it is. In other words, it ceases to be worthy of the
appellation “Constitution.”
My response to the first critique is anticipated by the prior discussion of the
basis for originalism. Assertion is an insufficient substitute for persuasive
argument when it comes to a foundational issue such as the proper methodology
for interpreting and applying the Constitution. Unless it can be established that
originalism is the only plausible method of constitutional interpretation or that
constitutional law would be a disaster without strict adherence to the original
meaning, simply asserting that originalism is entailed by the nature of law is an
insufficient basis for recognizing judicial power to override political decisions on
important social issues. And there is nothing illogical or paradoxical or
implausible about a method of constitutional interpretation that would be sensitive
to factors other than the intent of the Framers such as social welfare or
acceptability according to evolving principles of justice. It happens in the United
States and countries across the globe every day. Some of these systems of justice
are admirable and some are horrifying, but the difference does not lie in whether
their judges adhere to originalism as a method of constitutional interpretation.
Justice Antonin Scalia’s self-described “faint-hearted originalism,” laid out
in his 1988 Taft Lecture, is an example of a methodology that expands the frame of
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reference to include factors other than the original meaning of the Constitution.34
In explaining his views, Justice Scalia conceded that even an originalist would not
uphold corporal criminal penalties that would have been viewed as routine and
perfectly acceptable by the Framers of the Eighth Amendment. Presumably, an
impure form of originalism such as Justice Scalia’s is what allows originalists to
support applying the Equal Protection Clause to discrimination against women
despite relatively clear evidence that the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment
did not intend to outlaw sex-based discrimination. Of course, “pure originalists”
such as Randy Barnett viewed Justice Scalia’s self-characterization as a betrayal, if
not personal than at least a betrayal of the originalist ideal.35 To them, any
deviation from the original meaning of the Constitution is heresy especially when
the deviation is made by the Supreme Court. In my view the simple insistence that
constitutional law requires adherence to original meaning or some other form of
originalist theory is the weakest argument for originalism.
The principal problem with the second critique, that without originalism the
Constitution devolves into an application of the subjective views of the judges
deciding cases is that much if not virtually all of the Constitution already is
composed of the subjective views of the judges deciding cases, and always has
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been. Originalism did not prevent the Court from interpreting the Equal Protection
Clause to allow racial discrimination or later prohibit gender-based discrimination,
it did not hinder the Court’s imposition of laissez faire economics during the
Lochner era, it did not prevent the twentieth century expansion of the commerce
power or the creation of extensive non-economic rights under the due process
clauses, and it did not prevent the Supreme Court from overthrowing state and
federal attempts to preserve election fairness through campaign finance regulation.
In short, even without a thoroughgoing rejection of originalism, the Supreme Court
is not and has never been actually constrained by any theory of interpretation
including originalism. In each case it simply applies whatever methodology best
supports the current decision.
A likely response to my conclusion that the Court’s decisions have not
previously been constrained is that the whole point of originalist argument is to
correct that error. Their goal is to persuade the Court to adopt originalism and if it
did so, it would be constrained. Justice Thomas, for example, has consistently
advocated for a more originalist view of the Constitution, and if a majority of
Justices joined him, the Court would operate under the constraint of the originalist
methodology. On this view, my argument against originalism is unfair because my
problem is not with originalism but with the failure to adopt and apply originalism.
It’s like criticizing nutritionists because people still eat French fries.
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My first reply to this is to remind the reader that the main problem with
originalism as I see it is that originalists would sacrifice the welfare of society in
service of originalist ideals, which I believe is not only wrong but an immoral use
of government power. Government officials should use their power to increase
social welfare, not decrease it. Now if originalism of some form turned out to be
better in that it proves to be the best methodology for advancing social welfare,
then I would say sure, we should employ originalism as our methodology. Some
originalists appear to recognize this when they stress that adherence to the text and
meaning of the Constitution, especially the procedural and structural aspects of it
enhances liberty. But that does not support the argument that adherence to original
intent provides more constraint than other possible methodologies and it is not
clear that originalism is better at preserving liberty than other potential
methodologies, such as a non-originalist aggressive application of the Due Process
or Privileges and/or Immunities Clauses to invalidate legislation perceived by
judges to infringe on liberty. It also depends on contested views of the nature of
liberty. Robert Bork, an originalist, favored judicial restraint and famously
espoused the view that judicial invalidation of legislation interferes with the right
of the majority to govern.36 Perhaps the liberty of businesses was enhanced during
the Lochner era, but what about the liberty of workers and consumers? People
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who breathe can credibly argue that their liberty is enhanced by strict
environmental regulation of polluting businesses unless perhaps the definition of
liberty includes the right to spend money on medical bills and funeral services.
The freedom of judges to declare the law is unfortunate not only because of
the highly political nature of the appointment process. It is also because it is
inconsistent with democratic values to entrust so many important issues to decision
by unaccountable federal judges. Because the Constitution leaves so many
important issues unresolved, federal courts are constantly faced with the question
whether they should defer to legislative and executive judgments or impose their
own views of the requirements dictated by the Constitution. If judges were more
concerned with social welfare or more deferential to others’ judgments, the
openness of the Constitution might not be as problematic as it has become under
current circumstances.
Even if we meet the rule of law argument on its own ground, I do not
believe there are reasonable grounds to conclude that originalism would provide
the sort of constraint that rule of law originalists claim, at least as applied to the
Constitution of the United States. Although we know that past performance does
not guarantee future results, I find it fair to bring up our historical experience with
originalism to show that it is not likely to succeed in constraining judges. As we
have seen, even Justices who purport to be originalists don’t always follow original
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intent, and even when they claim they are, close examination reveals, as in the
knock-and-announce case that they bend original intent to suit their normative
views. Another methodology is necessary for the numerous issues for which
original intent is undiscoverable, and open-ended provisions like the Ninth and
Tenth Amendments provide minimal constraint on judicial decisionmaking. We
are talking about a group of human judges with different experiences and differing
views, not a set of machines that can be relied upon to spit out mathematically
correct responses to complicated problems.
This most important aspect of the rule of law is the imperative that
government officials, and all people from the least to the most privileged members
of society, must obey the law as decreed by judges who enjoy a significant
measure of independence.37 It does imply a preference for certainty in legal rules,
but that concern places a distant second to the fundamental requirement of
obedience to the law as decreed by courts. The preference for clear rules is an
established element of legal reasoning but not primarily because unclear legal
standards are inconsistent with the rule of law but mainly because clear legal rules
tend to improve social welfare and minimize the opportunity for arbitrary judicial
decisionmaking.

37

See A.V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (1885), P.P. Craig, Adminsitrative Law 4
(2d ed.1989).
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IV. Displacing and Replacing Originalism
It would perhaps be the height of arrogance to propose a method of
constitutional reasoning cleansed of originalism and proclaim it as the ideal
substitute for current practice. So here goes! (At this point, if this were a text
message I would insert the appropriate emoji, probably a winking smiley face.)
Actually, I will not pretend to have an answer. The irony, of course, is that
anything I propose is vulnerable my principal indictment of originalism, that it is
insufficiently attentive to social welfare. But while I do not pretend to have
confidence that banishing originalism would be socially beneficial or that any
replacement I propose would produce superior results as a matter of social welfare,
I can promise that my views are based solely on notions of social welfare, without
conscious taint of ideology or adherence to methodological principles regardless of
social welfare.
I also need to clarify my attitude toward originalist constitutional law before
moving on to the issue of the appropriate replacement. I do not mean to suggest
that courts should never follow the text or original meaning of the Constitution
under any circumstances. Quite the contrary. When the text or meaning of the
Constitution is clear and it does not appear that social welfare is harmed by
following it, then in all likelihood the stability and predictability gain is worth the
cost of losing out on potential gains from marginal adjustments in constitutional
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law. I recognize that pure textualism is impossible since at a minimum, context
and conventions are necessary background to understanding the meaning of any
text, but many issues are easily resolved by referring largely to unambiguous
constitutional text. But again, pursuing social welfare ought to be the primary
value pursued in legal decisionmaking, even in the face of what would be regarded
as unambiguous text.
What I mean to rule out is “originalism for the sake of originalism,” the idea
that the original intent, however discerned, should be treated as binding law subject
to alteration only through the procedures specified in the Constitution for
amending it. In my view, as described above, it is immoral to place adherence to
original intent above social welfare.
In controversial issues judges, even those purporting to be originalists, pretty
much do what they think is right regardless of allegedly binding authority. And by
“right” I mean a combination of political ideology, political affiliation and crude,
relatively uninformed, policy judgment. Given what I view as disastrously bad
constitutional law in some areas, it would be nice to have a theory that would
replace current practice and produce better results, but I don’t see any competing
comprehensive theory on the horizon. Perhaps encouraging judges to show a bit
more restraint when they are asked to overturn the will of a majority in areas with
great social consequences such as campaign finance and gun control, coupled with
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better judges, would do the trick. But given the highly politicized nature of
appointment of federal judges and the current partisan divide, there can only be
faintest of hopes that the quality of federal judicial appointments will change for
the better in the foreseeable future. It is extremely unlikely that the federal
judiciary will be staffed by judges swayed less by the ideological aspects of
controversial cases than about their social welfare effects.
In terms of the shape of constitutional law sans originalism for the sake of
originalism, it is important to understand that this whole discussion takes place
against the background of a constitutional law that currently contains substantial
non-originalist reasoning in the many areas of law in which original intent is nonexistent, not discernible or so abhorrent or outdated that even originalists decline to
follow it.
Non-originalist legal reasoning is familiar to all lawyers. It consists of the
application of legal texts, legal principles and precedent, informed by policy
considerations and colored by evolving social consensus more or less influenced
by society’s power dynamics. Analysts disagree over the degree to which
consideration of principle and policy do or should overwhelm judicial
consideration and application of text and precedent; in this regard I identify with
those who believe that policy should be the primary consideration, and I also
believe that legal principles often embody policy considerations. However, narrow
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diversity of experience and background among judges means that these instinctive
senses of good policy are likely to be colored by social background, self-interest
and other biases.
The elimination of originalism for the sake of originalism might open
constitutional law to greater consideration of what has been termed “aspirational
constitutional law.” As Kim Lane Scheppele has described it, “[a]spirational
constitutionalism refers to a process of constitution building . . . in which
constitutional decision makers understand what they are doing in terms of goals
that they want to achieve and aspirations they want to live up to.”38 Similarly,
Robin West has characterized aspirational constitutional law, at least as practiced
in the legislative branch, as “a law of ideal moral principles-those principles of
distributive justice toward which our politics aspire.”39 But the idea of aspirational
constitutionalism is in no way a recent creation. For example, in 1851,40 Frederick
Douglass proclaimed that the Constitution is an anti-slavery document that can be
“wielded on behalf of emancipation” and on July 5, 1852, he characterized the
Constitution as a “glorious liberty document.”41 This despite the Constitution’s
implicit and explicit endorsement of slavery.
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Kim Lane Scheppele, Aspirational and Aversive Constitutionalism: The Case for Studying Cross-constitutional
Influence through Negative Models, 1 International Journal of Constitutional Law 296, 299 (2003).
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My only point of disagreement with these, and other, characterizations of
aspirational constitutional law is that they focus too much on principle to the
exclusion of policy. I recognize that many constitutional controversies revolve
around principles such as equality and autonomy, but surely preservation of health,
safety and prosperity are also important social goals relevant to constitutional law.
Too often, ideological commitments obscure clear thinking and rational policy
choices. In my view, originalism is one among many ideological commitments
whose role in constitutional decisionmaking ought to be minimized.
The key question that confronts me is whether courts should explicitly or
exclusively consider social welfare in making their decisions. There are numerous
pros and cons to explicit judicial consideration of social welfare. On the positive
side, in my view basic morality requires government officials, including judges, to
pursue social welfare in everything they do in in their official roles, and it would
be odd to expect them to do that while prohibiting them from openly considering
the matter in their deliberations and decisions. My hesitation from endorsing
explicit judicial focus on social welfare is that when they may not really be
equipped to do so. When they have done so in the past they have sometimes made
disastrous errors. The best example is qualified immunity. In 1982, for reasons
sounding purely in social welfare, the Court eliminated the requirement that
government officials act in good faith in order to be protected by qualified
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immunity.42 The Court based its decision on what it saw as the negative social
effects of litigation against government officials alleging that they had acted in bad
faith; according to the Court, too many insubstantial cases were getting past
summary judgment and litigation was distracting government officials and making
them reluctant to take socially beneficial actions that might provoke litigation. By
removing the most realistic avenue for challenging abuse of government power,
this change appears to have disabled the legal system from dealing with police
misconduct which, in some eyes, has reached epidemic proportions in the United
States.43 Importantly for present purposes, the Court’s decision was purely
normative as all traditional versions of immunity had included the good faith
requirement.44
A similar critique applies to the Court’s campaign finance jurisprudence.
American constitutional law more vigorously protects political, commercial and
artistic speech than the law in any other country in the world with which I am
familiar. Traditionally, liberals favored broad protections for political and artistic
speech, while conservatives were most anxious to expand constitutional protection
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of commercial speech, and they added monetary expenditures to the definition of
political speech. The Court’s decisions have swept away mountains of regulation
in all three areas; for example, pornography is now freely available due to the
Court’s obscenity decisions that treat it as artistic speech, pharmaceutical
companies and lawyers, among others, freely advertise due to the Court’s
commercial speech decisions and the voices of big money interests in the political
arena have been vastly amplified due to the Court’s campaign finance decisions.
Originalism plays virtually no role in the First Amendment basis for judicial
invalidation of campaign finance regulation.45 In fact, First Amendment
originalism is virtually impossible since, as Robert Bork famously reminded us,
“[t]he first amendment, like the rest of the Bill of Rights, appears to have been a
hastily drafted document upon which little thought was expended.”46 The Court’s
decisions have unleashed a flood of money into the political system which, to
some, has had disastrous effects on our elections and the quality of government in
the United States.47 Like qualified immunity, the Court’s decisions are based, at
least in part, on its policy judgments, here that “any ‘undue influence’ generated by
a speaker’s ‘large expenditures’ was outweighed ‘by the loss for democratic

See generally Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
Robert Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 Ind. L.J. 1, 22 (1971).
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processes resulting from the restrictions upon free and full public discussion.’”48
However, in the First Amendment area, considerations of social welfare, other than
generalities concerning the importance of political speech to preserving democratic
accountability of government, are in the background as compared to discussions of
principles and precedent. The Court does conclude, in its most (in)famous
campaign finance decision, that independent political expenditures do not corrupt
politicians, but it has no basis in fact for that conclusion; likewise it concludes
without empirical support, that “[t]he appearance of influence or access . . . will
not cause the electorate to lost faith in our democracy.”49 These are assertions
unsupported by research or scientific examination and, in light of the consistent
attacks on federal elections in recent years, may be sadly inaccurate. The Court’s
view that political spending is a form of speech worthy of the strongest form of
protection under the First Amendment has not been subjected to a sustained
examination from the point of view of social welfare and in my view, the Court
does not seem to really care. There is no serious consideration of the social
welfare effects of equating campaign-related expenditures with other forms of
political speech.

Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 344 (2010), quoting United States v. CIO, 335 U.S.
106, 155 (1948) (Rutledge, J. concurring in the result).
49
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In recent years, many have come to believe that these protections have had
significant negative social effects by, inter alia, facilitating the election-related
spreading of divisive speech and false information, the difficulty caused by the
inability to curb defamatory speech, the perversion of our political process by big
money interests and the easy availability of pornography on the internet. It has
been argued that the Supreme Court uses the First Amendment as a vehicle for
engaging in Lochner-like social engineering (based on ideology, not considerations
of social welfare) that has been virtually unanimously repudiated in the realm of
economic regulation.50
What unites these two areas of law? In both, in my judgment, which I
realize is subject to dispute and disagreement, the Court has exercised its power in
ways that are destructive of social welfare. What makes it interesting to consider
them together is that while neither is heavily influenced by originalist thought, one,
qualified immunity, considers only social welfare, while the other, First
Amendment protection of campaign-related expenditures, focuses primarily on
principles and precedent. These are anecdotes, of course, in isolated and
politically-charged areas of the law, and thus cannot be the basis for general
conclusions about the quality of the Court’s decisionmaking. I also do not mean to
suggest that I have sufficient evidence to conclude that courts are uniformly bad at
50
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making decisions in light of social welfare concerns. It may be, for example, that
state courts have been very good at shaping the common law to further social
welfare where that is a primary focus in areas such as the law of property, torts and
contracts. That is why some law and economics scholars privileged state common
law as a model of rational decision making51 and perhaps explains the canon of
construction that statutes in derogation of common law should be strictly
construed. And it may even be the case that the constitutional law decisions of the
Supreme Court of the United States have greatly increased social welfare. But
consider the fact that, as far as I am aware, no Supreme Court Justice would
qualify under the Daubert52 standard as an expert witness on any of the policy
matters that either come explicitly before the Court or are at stake in its decisions.
V. Conclusion: The Effects of Non-originalist Decisonmaking
Without what may be impossible-to-obtain empirical support, it may not be
possible to come to strong or even tentative conclusions on the social welfare
effects of delegitimizing originalist constitutional decisionmaking. The most direct
way to increase the quality of judicial decisiomaking is likely to be simply
increasing the quality of judges, avoiding those who are blinded by ideological or
partisan commitments or committed to methodologies with no apparent connection
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to social welfare. Perhaps federal courts, like the Supreme Court, should have
professional staffs dedicated to analyzing the likely effects of competing legal
rules, much like Congress employs entities such as the Government Accountability
Office, the Congressional Research Service and the Congressional Budget Office.
Imagine a requirement that the Supreme Court accompany major decisions with a
regulatory impact statement embodying the Court’s judgment on the likely social
welfare effects of a change in constitutional law or statutory understandings.
Barring that, perhaps courts should admit that they are not competent to make the
types of judgments that ought to govern when they are asked to reject the
judgments of the legislative and executive branches and they should act only in
extremis and only when they are confident of the likely effects of their
interventions.
Given the extreme unlikelihood of a transformation in the judicial branch’s
structure or its role in the United States government, banishing arguments based on
originalism for originalism’s sake would likely result in decisions influenced
somewhat more by principle, policy and precedent, hopefully with an extra dose of
judicial restraint in light of the limitations on judges’ ability to make sensible
policy decisions. This may be due in part to my sense that when decisionmakers
shift their focus to disputes over the social welfare effects of competing rules, their
lack of competence to make a judgment may be revealed, even to themselves.
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Non-originalist decisionmaking might reveal strengths and weaknesses in policy
judgments that might otherwise be obscured by originalist rhetoric. In addition to
increased deference to the political branches and the expertise of agency
decisionmakers, the ground could be shifted to more sustained consideration of
human dignity, social welfare, individual autonomy and other values, in other
words the grounds upon which many informed members of society argue over
Supreme Court decisions.
While in an ideal world, some may advocate junking the entire system and
starting from scratch, in the real world there is, to my mind, nothing wrong with
beginning judicial decisionmaking with a presumption in favor of following
precedent. Holmes was certainly correct when he said, in the Path of the Law, that
“It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that it was laid down
in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon which it was
laid down have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind
imitation of the past.”53 However, in many situations, precedent appears to be a
useful repository of knowledge and, more importantly, experience. When
longstanding precedent has not been legislatively reversed or has not provoked
strong social opposition, e.g., in constitutional areas not subject to legislative
53
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overruling, precedent may embody sound policy. Put simply, when social forces
have settled on a status quo without significant agitation for change, there is reason
to believe that any achievable alternatives are less attractive.
So, is there reason to believe that non-originalist constitutional reasoning
would lead to better decisions than originalism? Here, I have to confess that I do
not know and I am not sure this is an answerable question. I would hope that by
focusing on social welfare, legal principles and other policy concerns,
decisionmaking would be better than if it were constrained by originalism detached
from social welfare concerns. But I have no evidence that this would be the case,
and there is a chance that things would get worse, that judges freed from the
perceived constraint of originalism would stray into decisions as harmful and
pernicious as Dred Scott,54 the Civil Rights Cases,55 Plessy v. Ferguson,56 Lochner
v. New York,57 Citizens United,58 District of Columbia v. Heller59 and McDonald
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v. City of Chicago.60 Notice, however, that the decisionmakers in this list of
greatest hits of terrible decisions were convinced, or at least claimed that they were
convinced, that they were obeying the meaning of the Constitution as understood
by the Framers of the Constitution. Certainly they were all made while under the
influence of originalist thinking. While some of them may have honestly believed
that they were doing the right thing in social welfare terms, without explicit
attention to what ought to be the primary guiding star of all government action, by
society, who knows?
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